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Davis: The Partnership-Level Audit--An Aggregation of Aggravation

NOTES
THE PARTNERSHIP-LEVEL AUDIT AN AGGREGATION OF AGGRAVATION*
IWRODUTION

For income tax purposes, a partnership is not a taxable entity.1 Instead,
partnerships are considered conduits through which the "items" 2 of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction and credit, are allocated among the partners for
inclusion in their respective income tax returns. Partnerships are required,
however, to file annual information returns detailing partnership items, partner
names, addresses, and distributive shares4 as well as other information required.5
Since a partnership is a conduit rather than a taxable entity, adjustments
to a partner's tax liability by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cannot be
made at the partnership level. Although the Service may examine the partnership books and records,6 any adjustments to tax liability must be made separately for each partner. 7 A settlement between one partner and the IRS is not
binding on any other partner or on the IRS in its dealings with other partners.8
Similarly, a judicial determination relative to a partnership item is conclusive
only as to those partners who were parties to the proceeding." Thus, each individual deficiency assessment or refund claim attributable to a partnership
item may be the subject of a separate administrative proceeding and, at the
*EDrroR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for

the best student note submitted in the Summer 1981 quarter.
1. I.R.C. § 701 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-1 (1960).
2. I.R.C. § 702 (West Supp. 1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(ii), T.D. 7192, 1972-2 C.B.
289,307 provides that each partner must also take into account separately his distributive
share of any partnership "item" which if separately taken into account by any partner would
result in an income tax liability for that partner different from that which would result if
that partner did not take the item into account separately. Thus an "item" is any component
of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit.
3. I.R.C. § 702 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see generally W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS § 1.01

saw TAxATiON § 1.04 (3d ed. 1981).
4. I.R.C. § 704 (1976 & Supp.

(1978); 1 A.

WILS, PARTNER-

M 1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1, T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177,

178.
5. I.R.C. § 6031 (1976) sets forth the requirements of the return of partnership income and
empowers the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations as to the form and content of
such returns.

6. I.R.C. § 7602 (1976).
7.

I.M.C. § 701 (1976).

8. Partners may, however, voluntarily join together in a single administrative proceeding.
This could be accomplished by the designation of a representative of the partners under
powers of attorney. See Treas. Reg. § 601.503 (1980).
9. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for application of the collateral estoppel

doctrine.
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option of each partner, the subject of a separate judicial proceeding. 10 There
are several judicial forums available to a partner opting to litigate beyond the
administrative level.",
Where the partnership has few partners the problems presented by separately examining each partner's return are usually manageable. 2 Auditing
13
problems are severe, however, when the partnership has numerous partners,
15
4
is geographically diverse,' or is multi-tiered. Such difficulties frequently arise
in syndicated tax shelter limited partnerships 0 where one general partner
typically manages the affairs of the partnership and numerous limited partners
hold their partnership interests as passive investors seeking economic and tax
benefits.1 Such tax shelter limited partnerships generally are structurally complex, giving rise to additional administrative difficulties within the IRS.'18
The IRS confronts several problems in auditing large, complex partnerships. First, the IRS must identify and control the income tax returns of all

10. Each partner has the option of pursuing his claim through the judicial system if he
is displeased with the outcome at the administrative level. See infra notes 173-74 and ac-

companying text regarding the procedure for initiating judicial proceedings.
11. The partner may choose to litigate his case in the Tax Court, the United States
Court of Claims, or the United States District Court. For a discussion of the jurisdictional

prerequisites, advantages and disadvantages of each, see generally Crampton, Forum Shopping,
31 TAx LAw. 321 (1978); Jones, Choice of Forum in Tax Litigation Revisited, 35 INST. ON
FED. TAX. 373 (1975). Also see infra note 50 and accompanying text for subsequent developments regarding jurisdictional prerequisites for United States District Courts.
12. In most such cases, the partners would consist of a centrally-located cohesive group
carrying on a business enterprise. Thus, one Revenue Agent could examine each return without undue inefficiency.
13. A large number of partners increases IRSs burden for several reasons. First, the
amount of time required to examine each partner's return increases proportionately. Second,
the greater the number of partners, the greater chance that there will be conflicts among
the partners resulting in inconsistent determinations. Third, there is an increased possibility
of having partners in IRS districts other than the one where the initial audit is being con

ducted.
14. When partners are located outside the IRS district where the examination of the
partnership return is bein conducted, the examining agent must contact each affected district
and notify them of the audit and the need to obtain and control the partner's individual

income tax return. See infra text accompanying note 21.
15. Multi-tiered refers to a partnership that has at least one partner that is a trust,
corporation or other partnership. See infra note 21. Significantly, the number of large,
geographically diverse partnerships has increased at a rate more than eleven times faster
than the overall increase in all partnerships. Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, Part 2:
Tax Shelters and Minimum Tax p. 17 (April 14, 1978) (prepared by the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation for the House Committee on Ways and Means).
16. For an illustration of the typical tax shelter limited partnership, see Abel, The
How-to of Real Estate Tax Shelters, FIN. ExEc., Sept. 1974 at 70; Goldstein & Coleman, Allocation of PartnershipDeductions 173 N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1975, at 1, col. I.
17. Tax benefits are obtained in several ways. First, the investor may be able to deduct
partnership losses against income from other sources. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-2 (1956). Second,
the partner may be entitled to credits against his income tax for investments made by the
partnership. I.R.C. § 38 (1976). Third, the character of income derived from the partnership
may be advantageous. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1202 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. See supra note 15.
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taxpayers to whom it may wish to issue a deficiency notice."" Complex tax
shelter arrangements may make identification of taxpayers ultimately affected
by an adjustment to a partnership item extremely difficult and time-consuming.20 If one or more partners is located in an IRS district other than the one
where the partnership examination is taking place, the examining agent must
notify each district of the examination and the need to obtain and control the
partners' individual income tax returns.21 At the conclusion of the examination, the agent issues a report to the partnership and forwards a copy of that
report to each district where a partner is located. 22 Upon receipt of the report,
an agent in the partner's district must review the proposed adjustments and
contact the partner.23 The period of limitations relative to the partner's return
often expires while the Service is awaiting resolution of the partnership examination. 24 In such cases the IRS seeks the taxpayer's consent to an extension
of the period for assessment. 25 If the taxpayer refuses to consent, a statutory
notice of deficiency is issued and the taxpayer must then file a petition in Tax
Court,28 or pay the asserted deficiency and sue for a refund.2 7 As a result, the
Service faces the possibility of multiple litigation, perhaps in different courts,
28
involving identical issues.
Current administrative procedures developed when partnerships were
typically closely knit business organizations with few partners. The service
asserts that current procedures fail to effectively deal with the proliferation of
large, geographically diverse and structurally complex partnerships. 29 To
concerns, the Department of the Treasury has proposed an
remedy2 these
"ientity" 0 approach to partnership audits. This note will examine the Treasury
proposal in detail, focusing specifically on its procedural and income tax implications. Alternative proposals by professional groups will be presented and
19. See I.R.C. § 6211 (1976) (definition of deficiency); I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1976) (notice of
deficiency).
20. Identification problems arise principally in multi-tiered partnerships. For example, a
partnership may have 100 partners, 20 of which are partnerships. One of the 20 partnerships
has 10 partners, two of which are partnerships, five are trusts, two are individuals and one is
a corporation. The partnerships, trusts and corporation each have partners, beneficiaries and
shareholders who may be affected by the original partnership. Thus, literally thousands of

tax returns may be affected by an adjustment to a partnership comprised of 100 partners.
21.

President's1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals:Hearings Before the Comm.

on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5815 (1978) (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r
of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter cited as Statement].
22.

Id.

23. Id.
24. Id. at 5831.
25. Id. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) (1976).
26. See-I.R.C. § 6218 (1976 & Supp. MI 1979).
27. See I.R.C. § 7422 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1881 (1976) (jurisdiction of U.S. District Court);
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) (jurisdiction of U.S. Court of Claims). See also supra note 11.

28. But see infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for application of collateral estoppel
doctrine.
29. Statement, supranote 21, at 5880.
30. See infra note 98 and accompanying text for an explanation of the entity theory of
partnership taxation.
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analyzed. Finally, a proposal that alleviates the problems of the IRS without
jeopardizing the entire scheme of partnership taxation will be suggested.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL THE PARTNERSHIP-LEVEL AUDIT

To solve administrative difficulties 1 in auditing large, complex partnerships, the Treasury has proposed that partnerships be treated as entities for
certain administrative provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.3 2 Under
the proposal, a single administrative proceeding would be undertaken in
the IRS district where the partnership maintained its principal place of
business. 3 3 Only the partnership, through a general partner 34 or other authorized representative, 35 would have the right to extend the period of limitations
on partnership adjustments, file a protest, seek further review, file an amended
partnership return, and execute settlement agreements binding on the partnership and its partners.36 No partner acting in his individual capacity could
commence, continue, extend or terminate the administrative proceedings concerning the partnership7 However, partners could individually execute a
closing agreement or similar binding document with respect to their individual
income tax liability, including their liability arising from the partnership.3 8
Individual partners would be given notice of, 39 and the opportunity to par-

ticipate in, any audit involving the partnership and all stages of administrative

31. Although the problems are referred to as administrative they nevertheless have substantial impact upon substantive provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
32. First proposed in 1978, the partnership-level audit remains an important goal to the
IRS. Congress did not adopt the proposal in 1978, but did make certain changes to the state
of limitations regarding federally registered partnerships, I.R.C. § 6501(o) (Supp. III 1979).
and imposed a fifty dollar per partner per month penalty for failure to file a timely partnership return, I.R.C. § 6698 (Supp. III 1979). See [1978] U.S. CODE 9- AD. NEws 2817-18. See also
1 A. WILLIS, supra note 3, § 2.09 for a summary of the legislation.
This note will examine in depth an internal, unpublished document drafted by the
Treasury which proposed adding a Subchapter C to Chapter 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Although submitted to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the proposals were not enacted into
law. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF TREAS. SEC. 245 AUDIT OF PARTNERSHIPs (1978)
(available from the University of Florida Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Proposed I.R.C.
§

-.
33.

Proposed I.R.C. § 6122.
34. The proposal provides that each general partner shall be presumed to be an
authorized representative of the partnership unless the partnership has filed (at the place
prescribed for filing its return) a power of attorney under which one or more persons have
the exclusive authority to take all such actions on behalf of the partnership. Id. § 6131(a)(3).
35. Id. § 6131(a)(3) defines authorized representative as any person authorized to take all
of certain enumerated actions on behalf of the partnership. It thus appears that such person
need not be a partner.
36. Id. § 6122(a)(2).

37.

Id. § 6131(a)(3).

38. A closing agreement entered into between a taxpayer and the IRS is final and conclusive and may not be modified or disregarded except upon a showing of fraud, malfeasance
or misrepreentation of a material fact. I.R.C. § 7121 (1976).
39. Proposed I.R.C. § 6122(b).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss1/5

4

Davis: The Partnership-Level Audit--An Aggregation of Aggravation

1981]

PARTNERSHIP-LEVEL AUDITS

review requested by the partnership.40 The proposed notice requirements extend to all real parties in interest-' and would be carried out by both the IRS
and the partnership, with the IRS responsible only for notifying first-tier
parties of major events in the proceedings. 2 The partnership and notified
43
parties would be responsible for fulfilling all other notice requirements.
Judicial review of the IRS's final administrative adjustment would be conducted in a single proceeding. 44 As in an administrative proceeding, only the
partnership could commence judicial action; no partner could do so in his
individual capacity. 5 Again, however, partners could participate in any
judicial proceeding initiated by the partnership. 41 The forum choices accorded
the partnership would be identical to those available to other taxpayers,
namely the Tax Court, the Court of Claims, and the United States District
Court for the district in which the partnership maintains its principal place
of business. 47 The proposal initially provided for a tax repayment mechanism
designed to ensure a partnership's access to both the Court of Claims and the
district court, subject to the same jurisdictional prerequisites applicable to
other persons or entities. 1 It should be noted that the jurisdictional amount
requirement has been statutorily eliminated for federal question jurisdiction
since the Treasury proposals were first made. 49
ProceduralImplicationsof the
Treasury Proposal
The proposal must first be tested by the minimum requirements of due
process. 50 It is readily apparent that the proposal severely limits a partner's
right to determine his own tax. 5" Accordingly, it must be determined whether
the proposal strikes an appropriate due process balance.
Fundamental to the concept of due process is the requirement of adequate
40. Id. §6122(c).
41. Real party in interest is defined as a person (other than a partner) whose income tax
liability is determined in whole or in part by taking into account partnership items or items
related to or affected by partnership items. Id. § 6131(a)(4).

42. Id. § 6122(b).
43.

Id.

44. Id. §§ 6125 & 6127.
45. Id. §§ 6125(a) & 6127(a)(1).
46. ld. § 7430(d).
47.

See supra note 11.

48. Proposed I.R.C. § 6237(a)(2). See supra note 28. The prepayment mechanism is mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), which
requires payment of the entire deficiency assessment amount as a prerequisite to a suit for a
refund in district court).
49. See P.L. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). The Flora holding, however, still requires payment of the full amount of the deficiency. 362 U.S. at 177.
50. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
51. See, e.g., Proposed I.R.C. § 6121(a)(1), which provides that each partner shall treat
partnership items as they were treated on the partnership return. This provision has been
criticized by professional groups as unduly restrictive. See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
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notice. Determining whether adequate notice was given necessarily involves a
subjective interpretation of the reasonableness of notice in the context of its
factual setting.52 The proposal seeks to give notice to all interested parties, but
in so doing it partially shifts the burden of notice to the partnership.3 In
essence, the proposal requires the IRS to notify all first-tier partners and certain real parties in interest of the initiation of the audit, any proposed or final
settlement or adjustment between the IRS and the partnership, and any claim
for adjustment.54 Other real parties in interest, however, must be given notice
only when the IRS is appropriately informed of their identity and address. 55
The partnership is obligated to notify all partners of every other significant
stage of administrative or judicial proceedings.56 Any party who receives notice
must in turn notify any party who was a real party in interest by reason of the
partnership interest of the primary recipient, the partnership and the IRS. 57
Once the IRS has notified partners and real parties in interest as made known
by the partnership, failure to notify any actual real party in interest will not
nullify any adjustment as to that person. 8
The shifting of the burden of notice to the partnership presents a troubling
aspect of the proposal. Typically, there are conflicts59 among partners in a
limited partnership that may hamper the free flow of information among
partners and, therefore, hinder the satisfaction of notice requirements.60 In
addition, the proposed definition of a real party in interest includes any
person whose income tax liability would be affected by an adjustment to a
partnership item. 61 By implication, current or past partners who were not
partners during the taxable year under examination could be included because
of carryover or carryback aspects of an adjustment.62 Moreover, the proposed
notice provisions lack correlation with existing Code sections. For example,
I.R.C. § 7609 requires the IRS to notify persons named in a summons served on
a third party recordkeeper of such service.13 Because the proposal makes no
mention of section 7609, it is unclear whether the IRS will be required to
notify only the partnership, or include partners and real parties in interest. As

52. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
53.

See Proposed I.R.C. § 6122(b)(3).

54. Id. § 6122(b) & (d).
55. Id. § 6122(b)(2)(B).
56.

Id. § 6122(b)(2).

57. Id. § 6122(b)(3).
58. Id. § 6122(b)(2).
59. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
60. For example, partners satisfied with a proposed settlement with the IRS may be
hesitant to communicate the settlement to other real parties in interest for fear that they
might reject it.
61. See supranote 42.
62. For example, a current partner who was not a partner during the taxable year under
examination could be affected by a change in the basis of a depreciable asset which would
alter deductions for depreciation expense in subsequent years.
63. I.R.C. § 7609 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) requires that the person identified in a thirdparty summons directed toward a recordkeeper be given notice of the service of the summons
on the third party and be given information on staying compliance.
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a result, the notice provisions of the proposal present a significant obstacle to
4
the smooth operation of the partnership-level audit.6
A second fundamental drawback of the partnership-level audit proposal
6 5
lies in its failure to adequately protect dissenting partners. There are four
areas of concern: (1) whether some parties may settle with the IRS when others
refuse to settle,6 6 (2) whether a partner may utilize information different from
that provided by the partnership when filing his individual income tax return, 7 (3) whether minority partners may institute a claim for adjustment
after the original partnership return is filed, 68 and (4) who determines the
judicial forum when partners disagree.6 9 Given the proposal's failure to consider these items and the virtual irrebuttability of the general partner's position, minority partners may face a fait accompli.7 Limited partners could not
necessarily depend on the IRS protecting them where the general partner incorrectly reported an item to the general partner's advantage, because the
partnership might not be audited or the IRS might collect more tax overall by
accepting the position of the general partner. 71 Limited partners may have
72
state law rights against the general partner for breach of fiduciary duty, but
these are likely to be effective only in severe cases and, even then, only if the
general partner has sufficient assets to satisfy the liability.'s
The proposal permits a partner to report a partnership item inconsistent
with information provided by the partnership, provided the partner discloses
64. Congress dearly has the power to establish statutes for the collection of taxes, and
legislation enacted to assist in the collection of revenue is to be liberally applied. See United
States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Lorton, 206 F. Supp. 351, 353
(E.D. Ill. 1961). There is, however, tension between this power and the notice requirements
set forth in Mullane. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65. "Dissenter" refers to any party who wishes to pursue a course of action different than
that pursued by the general partner or other authorized representative on behalf of the
partnership.
66. Essentially, the IRS may enter into a dosing agreement with one or more partners
with respect to their separate tax liability. In the context of large, geographically diverse
partnerships, however, this would not be feasible. I.R.C. § 7121 (1976).
67. Under current law, a partnership must provide each partner with information regarding the partner's distributive share of partnership items. I.R.C. § 704 (1976 & Supp. Inl
1979). The partner is not, however, bound to report the items on his individual return as
determined by the partnership but instead must report what he believes is the proper amount
and character of the various items. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1, T.D. 7192, 1972-2 C.B. 289, 807.
68. A claim for adjustment refers to a request for modification of the partnership's
previously filed return on behalf of the partnership, not individual partners.
69. Assuming the partnership decides to litigate beyond the administrative level, it must
then decide which forum to use. See supranote 11.
70. In the absence of partnership-imposed restrictions, any general partner may bind the
partnership and all other partners in a settlement with the IRS. See supra notes 85-38 and
accompanying text.
71. The general partners may be willing to accept an adjustment to an item that is
allocated in full to the limited partners in exchange for a favorable settlement with the IRS
of an item that was allocated in full to the general partner.
72. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY § 14A (1958).
73. But see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1967) (requirement of minimum net worth
of general partner in order to avoid the corporate characteristic of limited liability).
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the discrepancy on his individual return.7 4 In addition, any partner disagreeing
with a determination made by the general partner could request the appointment of a master by the Tax Court who would review the matter to determine
its reasonableness.7 5 These two provisions constitute the only protection afforded minority or dissenting partners. Consequently, the proposal does not
provide meaningful rights to such partners.
In addition to the fundamental issues of notice and dissenters' rights, there
are other important procedural implications of the partnerhip-level audit
proposals. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have potential
application because the proposal seeks to give finality to a judicial proceeding
and bind persons who were not parties to the proceeding.76 Res judicata accords
finality to an action by forbidding repetitive litigation once a dispute has been
finally decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.7 7 Collateral estoppel, on
the other hand, subsequently bars only those matters that were fully and fairly
litigated and on which a finding or verdict was rendered75 These rules are important in the consideration of the rights of individual partners, particularly
dissenting partners, vis-a-vis the IRS.79 Because of varying circumstances of
partners, it is common for a partnership item to be immaterial to one partner,
but material to another.8 0 Unfortunately, the proposal gives no consideration
to the materiality of items to respective partners. The consequence of this
scenario could be the loss of a taxpayer's valuable right to litigate an issue that
received little attention in a prior suit merely because it was immaterial to the
majority of partners.3 '
The venue provisions of the proposal may also present undesirable implications. The proposal provides that venue lies only in the federal district
5
where the partnership maintains its principal place of business 2 Similarly,
administrative proceedings are to take place in the IRS district where such
place of business is maintained.13 While such venue provisions may be logical
84
and efficient due to the location of the partnership books and records, they
74. A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, pt. N, at 18 (March, 1981 Draft).
75. Id.
76. Each general partner or other authorized representative may bind the partnership
and hence the partners. See supra note 34-37 and accompanying text.
77. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
78. Id. at 598. See also Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620, 623 (1933). For a discussion of the application of collateral estoppel in tax controversies, see Comment, Divine v.
Commissioner: Collateral Estoppel and the Mutuality Requirement in Federal Tax Litigation, 60 IowA L. REv. 1420 (1975).
79. The problem of dissenting partners is by far the most serious obstacle facing the
partnership-level audit proposal. The theory of dissenters' rights stems from the contractual
relationship of the partnership agreement as well as the fundamental right to determine one's
own tax. For an analogous discussion of dissenters' rights in the context of corporation law,
see H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONs 349 (2d ed. 1970).
80. Due to the progressive structure of income tax rates, partners with substantial amounts
of income other than the partnership income will be affected greater than partners with
nominal amounts of other income. See I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1982).
81. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
82. Proposed I.R.C. § 6127(b)(2).
83. Id. § 6122(a).
84. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976) (venue for U.S. District Courts).
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may be detrimental to prudent tax planners. Specifically, the IRS typically
litigates key issues in favorable forums8 5 Thus, if several similar cases were
pending the IRS would vigorously pursue the case in the most favorable
circuit. Ever aware of this tactic, cautious taxpayers would respond to the
venue provisions of the proposal by creating their principal place of business
in jurisdictions favorable to them. This would be a simple matter for a syndicated limited partnership because the principal place of business might be no

more than the place where the partnership books and records were maintained.8 6 Thus, a partnership may locate its principal place of business primarily for income tax purposes without consideration of important factors

such as the location of assets owned by the partnership, residence of major
8 7
partners, and other significant economic consequences.
Finally, the proposal contemplates changing existing statutory provisions
governing the period of limitations on assessments 8 to permit any general
partner to extend the period of limitations on behalf of the partnership, except

that the partnership agreement may limit this right to specified general partners.89 In addition, the proposal provides that a final administrative determination regarding a partnership item must be made within three years of the
later of the filing of the partnership return or its due date. 90 The IRS then has
one year to assess tax based on that final administrative determination.91 If
there is no audit and final administrative determination, the tax must be assessed within four years of the later of the filing of the partnership return or
2
its due date.
Under such an entity approach it is possible that a partner who had either
not filed, or tardily filed, an individual return could escape assessment due to
the expiration of the period of limitations regarding the partnership.93 This
anomalous result is not possible under present law because the focal point of
the period of limitations is the filing date of the individual return.94
85. Compare Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981) (nonrecourse debt in
excess of fair market value of property not considered an amount realized upon disposition
of the property) with Millar v. Commission, 577 F.2d 212, 1978-2 USTC 19514 (3d Cir. 1978)
(nonrecourse debt in excess of fair market value of property must be considered an amount
realized upon disposition of the property).
86. In the typical real estate tax shelter partnership, the principal place of business
would be where administrative and financial matters were handled, irrespective of the location of partnership assets.
87. For example, if taxpayers perceived the Ninth Circuit to be a favorable tax climate
with respect to partnership issues, they might be inclined to create their principal place of
business in California, even though no partners resided there and none of the partnership's
assets were located there. Thus, the state of California would be economically affected by a
quirk of federal tax law.
88. See I.R.C. § 6501(o) (Supp. 1I 1979) for the existing statute of limitations.
89. Proposed I.R.C. § 6131(a)(3). See supranote 35.
90. Proposed I.R.C. § 6123.
91. Id. § 6126(b)(2).
92. Id. See also I.R.C. § 6501 (1976 & Supp. UI 1979).
93. In such a case, the period of limitations only with respect to the partnership items
would expire and the individual would remain liable for all other items. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3)

(1976).
94.

Id.
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Interactionof the Treasury Proposal
With Substantive PartnershipTax Law
The thrust of the partnership-level audit proposal is to treat the partnership
as an entity for certain administrative provisions of the Code.95 Although the
proposal is procedural in nature, it will have significant impact upon substantive partnership income tax law. Unfortunately, the proposal does not
mesh with existing substantive law.
Subchapter K, the substantive income tax provisions of the Code pertaining
to partnerships, 5 employs both the entity theory and the aggregate theory of
partnership taxation.9r The entity theory views the partnership as any other
entity, such as a corporation, in determining the amount and character of
partnership items. 9s Conversely, the aggregate theory views the partnership as
a group of partners in the nature of co-owners. 99 Prior to the 1954 Code, the
entity and aggregate concepts of partnership taxation developed by caselaw,
since there were no adequate statutory guidelines. 10 Subchapter K of the 1954
Code was written to fill this statutory gap. It evolved from the combined suggestions and concepts of numerous professional and governmental groups.' 0'
A primary concern in drafting Subchapter K was providing maximum flexibility in the arrangement of partnership affairs by partners. 0 2 Due to this flexibility, the partnership form represents the only viable business organization form
0
for the conduct of certain business ventures.1 3

Certain provisions of Subchapter K permit elections by a partnership that
result in an aggregate approach toward particular partnership items. For example, I.R.C. § 704 allows partners to allocate their distributive shares of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit via the partnership agreement' 0 4 provided
95. See supra text accompanying notes 32-49.
96. I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
97. For example, as a general rule, a partner's gain or loss on the sale of his partnership
interest is considered a capital gain or loss, reflecting an entity theory of taxation. I.R.C.
§ 741 (1976). However, where the partnership holds appreciated inventory or unrealized receivables, the aggregate theory is employed to trigger ordinary income treatment of the
selling partner's gain. I.R.C. § 751 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See also, W. McKEE, IV. NELSON &
R. WHrrMnmE, supra note 3, § 1.02[3].
98. See W. McKEx, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMIRE, supra note 3, § 1.02[2]; 1 A. WILus, supra
note 3, § 2.07.
99. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrmiRE, supra note 3, § 1.02[1]; 1 A. WuLs, supra
note 3, § 2.06.
100. See generally Rabkin & Johnson, The PartnershipUnder The Federal Tax Laws, 55
HARV. L. Ray. 909 (1942).
101. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 3, § 3.02.
102. "In establishing a broad pattern applicable to partnerships generally, the principal
objectives have been simplicity, flexibility, and equity as between the partners." S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1954).
103. The primary reason for use of a limited partnership as opposed to a corporation is
the flow-through to the partners of desirable tax attributes such as depreciation, investment
tax credit, depletion, and prepaid expenses. The limited partnership is highly desirable where
front end losses are anticipated, such as in mineral exploration and real estate development.
1 A. WILLIS, supra note 3, at § 1.01.
104. I.R.C. § 704(a) (1976). Special allocations are important in many partnerships to
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the allocation has substantial economic effect.1 05 Similarly, section"743 provides
for an optional adjustment to the basis of partnership property, which has the
effect of applying changes to the partnership interest in the hands of a partner
to the underlying assets of the partnership. The purchaser of a partnership
interest may thus elect to adjust the basis of partnership property to reflect the
cost of acquiring the interest10 1 Both of these provisions illustrate a partnership's flexibility.107 This flexibility may be threatened by the proposed partnership-level audit. 08
Conflicting interests often arise between general and limited partners in
large limited partnerships. Typically, the general partner manages the day-today operations of the partnership and is compensated with a management
fee.109 The limited partners are generally passive investors1 0 seeking tax and
investment advantages. l Under the proposal, the general partner will conduct
administrative and judicial proceedings on behalf of the partnership with binding effect on all partners." 2 This authority is incongruous with the scheme of
partnership taxation because the general and limited partners usually seek
vastly different tax treatment." 8 The proposal gives the general partner almost
unlimited authority over such matters."14
Apart from the inherent conflicts within the typical limited partnership,
there are certain partnership items which require consideration in conjunction
with the partner's other income and deductions. For example, one of the most
frequently raised issues relating to a loss from a partnership is whether such
loss is deductible under the "at risk" provisions of the Code."L5 Similarly, anprovide for varying tax and economic desires of partners. See W. McKEa, W. NEsoN &
R. WHrrMmE, supra note 3, at § 10.01[2].
105. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1976). Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b), T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177, 178.
106. I.R.C. § 743(a) (1976) provides the general rule that the basis of partnership property shall not be adjusted as the result of a transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or
exchange or on the death of a partner unless the election provided by section 754 is in effect
with respect to such partnership. If such election were in effect, I.R.C. § 743(b) (1976) provides that the partnership shall increase (or decrease) the adjusted basis of the partnership
property by the excess of the basis to the tranferee partner of his interest in the partnership
over his proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property. Thus, in effect,
the transferee partner would receive the full value of his purchase price, in terms of basis, for
depreciation.
107. See supra note 102.
108. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 16.
110.

Limited partners may not participate in the day-to-day management of partnership

affairs. Any effort to do so would expose them to unlimited liability as a general partner.
UF. Lntrrmn PaR
ssm' Acr § 7 (1916).
I1. See supra note 103.

112. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
113. For example, the general partner may wish to capitalize certain costs to obtain
benefits under the partnership agreement relative to the allocation of proceeds upon the sale
of partnership assets. Limited partners, conversely, would prefer that the costs be deducted
currently to produce higher losses or decreased profits from partnership operations.
114. See supra note 34.
115. I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) permits the deduction of losses from certain
activities only to the extent of the aggregate amount with respect to which the taxpayer is at
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other common point of contention involves the recognition of gain on distributions to a partner,11 6 which requires a determination of the partner's basis in
his partnership interest."1 A partner's basis, like the at risk limitations, can
only be determined at the partner level because both can be affected by transactions unknown to the partnership. Both are affected by capital expenditures
made by the partner relating to the partnership interest,"5' by purchase or
other acquisition of a partnership interest,119 by gift of the partnership interest, 120 or death of a partner. 12' At risk amounts may be affected by the source

of cash contributed to the partnership 122 and by the identity of partnership
creditors.123 Thus, it is extremely difficult if not impossible for the general
partner to be cognizant of each partner's circumstances when making decisions
that bind all partners.
In addition to determinations that may be properly made only at the partnership level, there are other items which have varying degrees of significance
to partners. One group of notable items are the tax preferences.12 4 Various
items of tax preference are aggregated on the individual's return and, if they
1
exceed a specific amount, will result in the imposition of additional tax.

25

Thus, while the amount of tax preference items relative to the partnership may
be readily determined at the partnership level,1 26 the amount has no significance until related to the partner's individual return. Accordingly, an
equivalent amount of tax preference items arising from a partnership will have
different consequences on different partners' returns. As a result, inequities
may arise when a general partner consents to an adjustment that has no adverse
tax consequences to him127 but creates significant tax burdens for the limited
risk. At risk amounts include the amount of money and the adjusted basis of other property
contributed to the activity by the taxpayer, and certain amounts borrowed with respect to
the activity where the taxpayer remains personally liable for repayment or has pledged other

property for security.
116. I.R.C. § 731 (1976) provides that in the case of a distribution by a partnership to a
partner, gain shall not be recognized to such partner, except to the extent that any money
distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership immediately before the distribution.
117. See I.R.C. § 1011 (1976).
118. I.R.C. § 1016 (West Supp. 1982).
119. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976).
120. I.R.C. § 1015(d) (1976).
121. I.R.C. § 1014 (West Supp. 1982).
122. Treas. Reg. § 7.465-1.
123. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3) (1976).
124. Items of tax preference include accelerated depreciation on real property, accelerated depreciation on leased personal property, amortization of certified pollution control
facilities, depletion in excess of adjusted basis, capital gains, and adjusted itemized deductions.
I.R.C. § 57(a) (West Supp. 1982).
125. I.R.C. § 56(a) (1976) imposes an additional tax equal to 15% of the amount by
which the aggregate amount of items of tax preference exceed the greater of $10,000, or the
regular tax deduction for the taxable year.
126. Tax preference items must be determined at the partnership level and stated separately for each partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(8), T.D. 7192, 1972-2 C.B. 289, 307.
127. For example, the general partner may have incurred a substantial capital loss
during the taxable year affected. It would therefore be unconcerned with an adjustment
under I.R.C. § 57(a)(9)(B) (Supp. III 1979) (pertaining to capital gains for corporations).
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partners.328 The proposal provides nominal protection against such occurrences'2 and even less actual protection considering the litigation expenses
which would be incurred by a dissenting partner. 130
Unlike most provisions of the Code, Subchapter K provides an escape hatch
for certain partnerships. I.R.C. § 761 provides a mechanism for a partnership to
"elect out" of the provisions of Subchapter K.13 ' Although section 761 is somewhat narrow in its application,132 the majority of syndicated tax shelter partnerships could probably meet its requirements. 3 3 If the election were available
to such partnerships, the objectives of the partnership-level audit proposal
could be frustrated.'4
As the foregoing indicates, the proposal results in a piecemeal determination of tax liability.'"5 One item on a partner's return will be determined by
the partnership proceedings while all other items on that return must be determined in a separate administrative or judicial proceeding. Harsh results
may attend a limited partner's decision not to participate in the partnership
proceedings because the proposed change is immaterial to him. A subsequent
adjustment to other items on his individual return may make the previous
partnership adjustment quite significant. 36
The partnership-level audit proposal provides for a single administrative
or judicial proceeding to determine items relating to the partnership. Although a single proceeding is attractive in its resolution of similar items on
numerous returns, it frustrates the fundamental attribute of partnership taxation.37 The flexibility intended by the original enactment of Subchapter K
128. A limited partner may already be liable under I.R.C. § 56 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
and thus would be taxed at 15 percent of each additional amount of tax preference items.
129. See supranote 34.
180. While a dissenting partner may be faced with a significant increase in tax liability,
the increase may not warrant the expenditure of funds to litigate the issue, particularly if
the partner is distant from the proceedings.
131. All of the members of the organization must elect to be excluded from the application of Subchapter K. I.R.C. § 761(a) (1976).
182. The election is available to an organization only "if it is availed of (1) for investment purposes only and not for the active conduct of a business; (2) for the joint production,
extraction, or use of property, but not for the purpose of selling services or property produced
or extracted; or (8) by dealers in securities for a short period for the purpose of underwriting,
selling, or distributing a particular issue of securities." I.R.C. § 761(a) (1976).
13. Most real estate limited partnerships, for example, are availed of for investment
purposes only.
134. Although it is possible that some partnerships could avoid the provisions of the
partnership-level audit by electing out of Subchapter K under I.R.C. § 761 (1976), they would
be forced to forego the beneficial elective provisions as well. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 754 (1976).
135. This treatment is in contrast to the current determination of tax liability, where all
items on an individual's return are subject to adjustment, regardless of source. Once the individual's tax for that taxable year has been assessed, the return is effectively closed from
further adjustments. See I.R.C. § 6501 (1976 8- Supp. I1 1979).
136. The converse could also occur, for example, where the examination of the individual
return took place first and the taxpayer failed to contest an item because it was immaterial.
137. Since the underlying theory of partnership taxation is that of an aggregation of
partners, an entity determination of adjustments necessarily disrupts the entire scheme of
partnership taxation.
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will, to a large extent, be destroyed. Any flexibility drafted into the partnership agreement may be largely negated by the general partner's overwhelming
powers of settlement and control of the partnership proceedings."38
RECOMMENDATIONS BY PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

The Treasury proposal has been studied by several professional groups,
notably the American Bar Association (ABA)13 9 and the American Law Institute (ALI).140 These groups both recommend the adoption of some form of
partnership-level audit.141 The ABA suggests, however, that the entity audit of

partnerships should apply only to federally registered partnerships or partnerships with one hundred or more partners. 42 The ABA approach affords any
partner the right to dissent from any proposed administrative determination of
partnership items and to pursue that dissent in all administrative and judicial
forums.143 Procedurally, the ABA proposal utilizes the Tax Court to oversee

any dispute.'44 Thus, where an administrative proceeding has ended in settlement, a dissenting partner would have ninety days from the date of final
administrative determination to petition the Tax Court to appoint a special
trial judge. The trial judge would then issue notice to show cause as to why
the settlement should be allowed to the government and to the partnership.'45
Similarly, any partner could participate in any judicial proceeding, but only
partners possessing a significant interest in the partnership could initiate litigation if the partnership chose not to do so. 1 46 Overall, the ABA proposal focuses

on dissenters' rights to such a degree that much of the benefit of an entity approach is lost. If virtually all partners are permitted to pursue their claims
separately, the IRS will still be confronted with multiple proceedings, inordinate delay, and the possibility of inconsistent results.
The ALI proposal is the result of an in-depth study of the Treasury proposal and represents the most. thorough analysis of the problems associated with
such an approach. The ALI suggests, as does the ABA, that individual partners be permitted to report their distributive share of partnership items in a
manner that differs from the information received from the partnership, provided that such discrepancy is disclosed on the partner's return.147 The ALI
proposal further recommends that all partners have the right to meet with the
examining agent if the partnership is audited.14 In addition, partners who, in
the aggregate, have a twenty percent or greater interest in the item at issue
would have a right to obtain an appellate hearing on behalf of the partner138. See supranote 34.
139. See A.B.A., Section of Taxation Proposalas to Audit of Partnerships,32 TAx LAw.
551 (1979).
140. See A.L.I., supra note 74.
141. A.B.A., supranote 139, at 551; A.L.I. supra note 74, at 19.
142. A.B.A. supra note 139, at 554.
143. Id. at 553.
144.

Id. at 559-60.

145. Id. at 559.
146. Id. at 561.
147. A.L.I. supra note 74, at 26.
148. Id. at 27.
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ship, to file a petition in court, and to appeal a trial court determination.
These partners could also settle with the IRS, even though the partnership was
continuing its litigation. 49
The twenty percent interest that triggers the dissenters' rights is determined
by focusing on the items in dispute.150 These dissenting partners must collectively be claiming an allocation of at least twenty percent of an item in dispute
or be allocated twenty percent or more of an item after taking into account the
proposed adjustment. The partners may not, however, bind the partnership to
a settlement that does not have the concurrence of over eighty percent of the
partners.' 51
Under the ALT proposal, partners with partnership interests aggregating
less than twenty percent will be bound by the decision of the majority of partners once the partnership return is audited. The IRS may, of course, settle
with such partners separately if these partners are willing to do so. 5 2 Finally,
the rights afforded dissenting partners may be waived in the partnership agreement under the ALI proposal.1 53 Thus, the partnership agreement could require a partner to conform to the partnership's information regarding his
distributive share of partnership items when preparing his individual return. 5 4
If a partnership agreement had such a provision, the IRS could automatically
adjust any partner's return that was inconsistent with the information supplied
by the partnership. Unlike the ABA proposal, the ALI proposal would apply
to all partnerships.1 5
In most other material aspects the ALT proposal tracks the Treasury proposal. 56 If there is a weakness to be found in the ALT proposal, it lies in the
limited rights afforded dissenting partners. The twenty percent criterion could
effectively deprive a partner or group of partners of substantive rights in attempting to lessen the administrative burdens on the IRS.
ALTERNATE PROPOSAL

The partnership-level audit is a significant change in the administrative
provisions of the Code. As discussed earlier, such changes will have a direct
impact upon the substantive provisions of the Code regarding partnership
taxation. 5 7 Accordingly, any proposed change to the administrative provisions
should be carefully judged in terms of its impact upon partnership taxation.
Such a proposal should balance the administrative convenience to the IRS
against the rights of individual partners and the overall scheme of partnership
taxation.
149. Id.

150. Id. at 28.
151. Id. at 56.
152. Id. at 27.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id. at 42.
156. Compare A.L.I., supra note 74, at 49, with Proposed I.R.C. § 6122(b) (notice pro-

visions).
157. See supranotes 95-138 and accompanying text.
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158
Because the administrative burdens of the IRS are great, some form of
partnership-level audit appears to be warranted. The starting point in such an
approach is a single administrative proceeding which is binding on all partners. 159 The binding nature of the proceeding must in turn provide safeguards
to protect minority and dissenting partners. Accordingly, once a partnership
return has been selected for audit, the IRS would be obligated to notify all
partners and real parties in interest-6 to allow them to participate in the
audit. The notification of partners and real parties in interest would specify
where the audit was to be held. If the geographic diversity of the partnership
allegedly caused a hardship on any partner, a panel of three Tax Court judges
would determine the location of the audit. The panel would consider all
relevant facts, such as residence of major partners, location of the partnership
books and records, location of tangible assets owned by the partnership, and
6
any other factors deemed relevant by the panel.' ' Upon commencement of the
audit, any partner would have the right to meet with the examining agent to
discuss partnership matters. 62 At the conclusion of the audit or when a settlement was reached the examining agent would issue a notice of proposed adjustment 63 to the partnership and to each partner and real party in interest.
Each recipient of the notice of proposed adjustment would be entitled to
file a protest 16 4 within sixty days of the date of issuance of the notice. Any such
protests filed would be reviewed by the Tax Court panel to determine if they
165
Protests found meritorious
warranted further consideration by the IRS.
consideration consistent
further
for
agent
would be forwarded to the eKamining
66
would then issue a
agent
The examining
with the findings of the panel.
parties in interreal
and
second notice of proposed adjustment to all partners
check
independent
an
est. Thus, the Tax Court panel is intended to serve as
inand
adjustments
on the actions of the examining agent to prevent arbitrary
prothe
in
equitable settlements favoring the general partner. At this point

158. See supra notes 6-29 and accompanying text.
159. But see infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text for discussion of dissenters' rights.
160. See supra note 41 for definition of real party in interest.
161. This procedure is intended to discourage any inclination toward establishing the
partnership's principal place of business in a jurisdiction that is taxpayer-oriented. See supra
text accompanying notes 82-87.
162. Alternatively, any partner would have the right to correspond with the examining
agent to set forth any items deemed relevant by the partner.
163. The notice of proposed assessment would set forth adjustments to the partnership
return of income previously filed, which would then flow through as adjustments to the returns of partners and real parties in interest.
164. The protest would be an informal objection to the notice of proposed assessment.
It need not conform to any specific format other than a clear and concise statement as to the
reason for the protest.
165. Standards used in evaluating such protests should be fairly broad. The panel should
strive to eliminate inequities resulting from the entity system of audit, but not inequities
caused by substantive tax laws.
166. The examining agent would not be duty-bound to incorporate each and every
recommendation of the Tax Court panel into the final notice of proposed adjustment. However, serious omissions by the agent could provide grounds for later judicial bodies to disregard the adjustments.
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ceedings, the partnership would have the option of executing a waiver 1 67 to
permit assessment of tax against the partners based upon the partnership adjustments or filing a protest 68 with the IRS. The protest would lead the partnership to a higher level of administrative proceeding within the IRS, the
appellate office hearing.169 The partnership would be required to notify all
70
partners and real parties in interest of its selected course of action.:
As in the initial audit, any partner or real party in interest would be entitled to participate in the appellate office hearing. After consideration of all
7
relevant information, the hearing officer would issue a preliminary report' 3
to the partnership, partners, and real parties in interest summarizing proposed
adjustments. The partnership would then have the option of executing a
waiver to permit assessment of tax against the partners or ignoring the preliminary report. If the partnership ignores the preliminary report, the partnership, partners, and real parties in interest would automatically receive a
statutory notice of deficiency based on the adjustments set forth in the preliminary report. Upon receipt of the statutory notice of deficiency, the partnership would have the option of filing a petition in Tax Court or having the
requisite number of partners pay the proposed deficiency and sue for a refund.
At this stage, only partners possessing aggregate partnership interests of ten
percent or more could dissent from the actions of the partnership. 72 If partners
representing a sufficient interest objected to the partnership's decision, they
could file a petition in Tax Court or pay the proposed tax and sue for refunds
notwithstanding the fact that a majority of partners had settled.' 73 Conversely,
167. The waiver would permit prompt assessment of tax based upon the adjustments set
forth in the notice of proposed assessment. Without such a waiver, the IRS must wait 30
days before issuing a statutory notice of deficiency. See I.R.C. § 6212 (West Supp. 1982).
168. This level of protest is equivalent to the present system and would have more
formal requirements. See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(c)(2)(iii) (1980).
169. "The mission of Appeals is to resolve tax controversies, without litigation, on a
basis that is fair and impartial to both the Government and the taxpayer and in manner
that will enhance voluntary compliance and public confidence in the integrity and efficiency
of the Service." Rev. Pxoc. 79-34, 1979-2 C.B. 498.
170. This is to protect dissenters' rights at this critical point in the administrative proceedings. Failure of notice at this point could result in loss of further administrative appeal
if the partnership failed to file a protest within the requisite time. Dissenting partners should
be provided additional time within which to file a protest if the partnership fails to do so.
See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
171. The preliminary notice would be equivalent, in terms of notice, to the notice of
proposed assessment. Dissenting partners would not, however, have any right to protest the
settlement and their only recourse would be to file a petition in Tax Court if they had
sufficient aggregate interest in the partnership. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
172. The 10% criterion could be met in several ways. First, partners owning an
aggregate of 10% of the capital interests in the partnership would qualify, since they
would consitute a significant segment of the ownership of the partnership. Second, partners
claiming an allocation of 10 percent of an item in dispute, would qualify since they would
bear the income tax impact of such an allocation. Third, partners allocated 10% of an
item in dispute after taking into account the proposed adjustment would qualify since they
also would bear the income tax impact of such an adjustment.
173. In this instance, a waiver executed by the partnership to the assessment of tax based
on the settlement would be ineffective since certain partners could file a petition in Tax Court
notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the partners had settled.
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such partners could execute waivers to permit assessment of tax even though
the partnership filed a petition in Tax Court or was suing for a refund. 7 4 The
ten percent criterion is an attempt to protect the substantive rights of a material segment of the partnership while preserving the major benefits of an
entity audit system. It strikes a balance between administrative efficiency and
partner autonomy. Partners consenting to the proposed adjustments would be
required to amend their income tax returns within ninety days of the date of
the preliminary report. Failure to file an amended return within this period
would permit the IRS to assess tax against the consenting partners based upon
175
the adjustments set forth in the preliminary report.
If the partnership chose to file a petition in Tax Court or, alternatively,
had a sufficient number of partners pay the proposed tax and sue for refunds,17 6
the majority' 7' of partners would determine the forum. Again, if partners
possessing an aggregate of ten percent or more of the partnership interests disagreed with the choice of forum, they could proceed independently. 78 Access
to appellate courts would be determined in much the same manner. Partners
possessing the requisite aggregate interests could thus seek review of a trial
court decision even though the partnership was satisfied with the trial court
results. 179 Participation in any judicial forum would be unlimited, except that
those partners dissenting from the partnership proceedings could not participate in the partnership's proceedings nor could the partnership participate
in the dissenters' proceeding. 80 Venue in all judicial proceedings would be
determined by the Tax Court panel.' 8 ' In making venue decisions the panel
would use those factors considered in determining venue in administrative
2
proceedings .
The mechanism for initiating a refund claiml83 would be similar to the
assessment procedure. The partnership would be required to file an amended
return within the limitations period 8 4 and make a claim for adjustment on
which refunds would be based. If the IRS agreed with the claim for adjustment

174. See supranote 11.
175. The IRS could treat the failure to file an amended return as a mathematical error
and assess tax based on the adjustment to the partnership return. See I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1) (1976).
176. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for an explanation of the need to pay the

tax.
177. The majority of the partners would be determined by the partnership agreement as
if it were any other matter requiring the vote of all partners.
178. Any dissenting partners would, of course, be required to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the forum selected.
179. A decision of the United States Court of Claims may be appealed only in the
United States Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
180. To do otherwise would be to allow partners to have a second chance of litigating an
issue after failing in their initially chosen forum.
181. See supra text accompanying note 161.
182. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
183. A refund claim relates to the income taxes of partners and real parties in interest.
Such a claim must, however, be instigated through the procedure of filing an amended
partnership return of income.
184. See I.R.C. § 6501 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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each partner and real party in interest would be notified.'8 5 The recipients of
the notice would then be entitled to file amended returns and receive refunds
based upon the partnership adjustments. The IRS could subsequently contest
the amount of the refund, except for mathematical errors.'86 If the claim for
adjustment was denied by the IRS, the partnership would have the right to
pursue its claim judicially.187
Any partner could amend his individual income tax return regarding
partnership items even though the partnership did not amend its return. 88
The partner would be required, however, to disclose that he was differing from
the information supplied to him by the partnership. 8 9 Unlike the assessment
procedure, there would be no need for a partner to possess a specified interest
in the partnership in order to seek such a refund. The ten percent requirement,
paralleling dissenting partners' rights, would apply, however, if the partnership
had filed a claim for adjustment and certain partners objected to the claim.
Although this is an unlikely occurrence, it could occur where refunds for one
taxable year would result in increased tax liability in other taxable years, so
that the individual's overall tax liability increased. 190
Implicit in the success of a system for the protection of minority and dissenting partners is adequate notice throughout administrative and judicial
proceedings.' 9 ' Accordingly, any entity level audit proposal should contain
meaningful notice provisions. Due to the complex nature of most syndicated
limited partnerships, it is not realistic to require the IRS to bear the burden
of notice at every point in the proceedings. 192 The IRS should, however, be
required to notify partners and real parties in interest of certain events, such
as examination of the partnership return, issuance of a notice of proposed adjustment or preliminary report, statutory notice of deficiency, and any other
notice specifically required under the Code, such as notice of a third-party
summons. 93 The IRS should bear the burden of notice for these events because
each represents a significant stage in the proceedings where failure of notice
could immediately deprive a party of substantial rights. The partnership would
be obligated to notify its parties of every other meaningful stage in the proceedings.' 94 Each partner would in turn be required to notify any real party
in interest that had an interest in the partnership by reason of the primary
185. Each partner and real party in interest would in turn be required to notify any
other real party in interest who would be affected by the claim for adjustment by reason of
the recipients interest in the partnership. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
186. See I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1) (1976).
187. See supra note 11.
188. This would be equivalent to filing the original individual return in conflict with
the information provided by the partnership. See supratext accompanying note 74.
189. Id.
190. This might arise where it was determined by the partnership that income reportable in year one actually was properly attributable to year two. If a significant number
of partners had higher marginal income tax rates for year two, the overall tax paid would be
greater.
191. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
192. See supranote 22.
193. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
194. See supranote 56 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

recipient's partnership interest. 195 Thus, the original notice by the IRS would
eventually filter down through the various tiers of a partnership until all
interested persons were notified. Conflict among partners may hamper the
efficiency of such a notice mechanism, 96 but compliance with the requirements
could be accomplished by the imposition of monetary penalties and forfeiture
of rights to participate in further partnership proceedings for failure to comply.
Because the audit of partnerships will be a time-consuming procedure even
after adoption of an entity approach, an extension of the existing period of
limitations for partnerships is recommended. 197 The modified statute would
provide the IRS with ample time to ensure that partnership-level adjustments
did in fact result in changes to partners' individual income tax liabilities. 9
In an audit of the partnership return, the period of limitations for all partners
would be extended to one year after resolution of the partnership audit. 99 If
a partner failed to file an individual return or filed late, the period of limitations would be measured from the filing date of that return, notwithstanding
the fact that the partnership proceedings had been concluded several years
earlier. 0 0 Any general partner or other authorized representative could consent
0°1
to an extension of the period of limitations on behalf of the partnership.
Analogous to the area of dissenters' rights, partners possessing aggregate partnership interests of ten percent or more may refuse to consent to the extension
of the period of limitations. 20 ' In such a case, the dissenting partners would be
issued a statutory notice of deficiency based on proposed adjustments. They
must then file a petition in 'Tax Court or pay the proposed deficiency and sue
3
for refunds in the United States District Court or the Court of Claims."
The concern for minority and dissenting partners is significant in the
04
partnership-level audit. Their rights stem from a contractual relationship2
and should not be derogated by an administrative provision of the Code. The
opportunity to be heard at all stages of administrative and judicial proceedings
provides minority and dissenting partners with some measure of protection.

195. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
197. See I.RC. § 6501 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) for the existing statute of limitations (as
modified in 1978 by I.R.C. § 6501(o) (Supp. III 1979) with respect to federally registered
partnerships).
198. The IRS must be given ample time to ascertain which partners and real parties in
interest have not filed amended tax returns in order to assess tax against them under the
mathematical error provisions of the Code. See I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1) (1976).
199. The resolution could take the form of a settlement or waiver by all parties or a
judicial decision.
200. This provision would prevent the anamalous result that could be obtained under
the Treasury proposal wherein the period of limitations with respect to partnership items
could expire notwithstanding the fact that an individual had failed to file an individual
return, or had filed late. Proposed I.R.C. § 6123.
201. See IR.C. § 6501(c)(4) (1976).
202. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 11.
204. The partnership agreement represents a contract among the partners for matters
relative to the partnership.
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Due to the costs associated with such appearances, 205 however, this protection
is in itself insufficient. Such parties should therefore be afforded the additional
208
safeguard provided by the intervention of the Tax Court panel. A dissenting
partner may communicate with the panel in an informal manner to voice his
objections regarding proposed partnership adjustments. This partner-by-partner
input would allow the panel to consider items that may be inequitable toward
a certain partner. 207 It may also bring to light a proposed settlement beneficial
to the general partners at the expense of limited partners. 20 For example, the
majority of partners may be unconcerned with a proposed adjustment to their
distributive shares of tax preference items, while a partner with a five percent
209
interest in the partnership would be significantly affected by the adjustment.
In such a case, the minority partner could file a protest with the Tax Court
panel, setting forth his reasons against the adjustment. Although this review
would not assure minority partners of an adjustment in their favor, it would
prevent arbitrary and unfounded actions by the IRS and majority partners. As
provided in the ABA proposal, the partnership could be forced to bear the
210
burden of proving that the proposed adjustment was proper.
The intervention of the Tax Court panel may be viewed as an unnecessary
step in the entity audit process. Minority partners must, however, be afforded
some opportunity to voice their objections over proposed adjustments, and
those objections should be reviewed by a group independent of the IRS. Conversely, to allow any and all partners to pursue separate administrative and
judicial actions would frustrate the intended purpose of the partnership-level
audit, namely the avoidance of multiple proceedings, inordinate delay, and
the possibility of inconsistent results. The Tax Court panel would thus afford
meaningful protection to minority partners while preserving the overall efficiency of the entity approach.
CONCLUSION

The partnership-level audit proposal would significantly disrupt the current
procedural scheme of partnership taxation. 211 If the current system of partnership taxation is undesirable, it should be amended through changes to the
substantive provisions of Subchapter K, not through procedural changes. The
IRS asserts that it should not be forced to operate under procedures that were
205. See supranote 10.
206. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
207. For example, a limited partner may have expended considerable unreported money
in acquiring his partnership interest. Thus, the examining agent's determination of that
partner's at risk amounts under I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979) would necessarily be
incorrect. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of such items that
must be determined at the partner level.
208. The general partner could, for example, consent to an adjustment to depreciation
expense where the entire amount was allocated to the limited partners in exchange for an
adjustment that would benefit himself.
209. See supranotes 124-29 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying note 145.

211. See supranotes 95-188 and accompanying text.
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